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NOTES.
RESTRAINTS

ON TIlE ALIENATION

OF EQUITABLE FEES IN

PENNSYLVANIA.-Mir. Gray wrote in 1883: "It ibspecially observed

that even in Pennsylvania, the mother of the so-called spendthrift
trusts, that is, trusts giving inalienable equitable life estates,
inalienable equitable fees are not allowed.", He based that
statement on Keyser's Appeals in which the cestui que trust was
permitted to terminate the trust notwithstanding a clause against
involuntary alienation. Keyser'sAppeas was generally considered
to indicate that the Pennsylvania court would not permit a spendthrift trust to be attached to any estate higher than an equitable
life estate, until the dicta in several cases decided in more recent
years have again thrown the question in doubt.

I Gray: Restraints on the Alienation of Property, ist ed., par.

15

(1883).

57 Pa. 236 (1886).

3 Note

2, supra.
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In Gunnell's Estate,' a recent Pennsylvania case, the testatrix directed that all of her property should be divided equally
among her six nephews, the share going to her nephew Harry
Knight "to be held in trust for him, he to receive the income during
his natural life without being subject to debts, contracts or engagements, and without the power or right of anticipation or alienation in any manner." Upon the death of Harry Knight, the
Orphans' Court ordered his trustee to pay the corpus of his share
to the administrator of his estate, and from that order an appeal
was taken. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held
that "now that the trust for him (Harry Knight) is at an end, by
reason of his death, the court below correctly held that the corpus,
of the share from which he received the income during his life,
should go to his administrator; the testatrix intended that Harry
Knight should take an absolute interest, and that absoluteinterest
was not cut down to a life estate by the trust created for his life."
Gunnell's Estate' arose after the death of the cestui que trust,
so the court did not have to decide the effect of the clause restraining the voluntary and involuntary alienation of the estate during
his lifetime. The case nevertheless suggests the question: What
would the court have decided if the devisee in his lifetime had
attempted to alienate the estate, or if his creditors had attempted
to attach it? That inquiry cannot be answered conclusively, but
it prompts a review of some of the Pennsylvania cases since Keyser's Appeal' in order to determine whether or not the recent cases
are in rapport with that case.
It has been stated that the rule under which the Statute of
Uses operates to give the cestui que trust the legal title at once, when
the trust is dry, does not apply to executors in Pennsylvania; but
that the executors are considered to have the legal estate, and the7
cestui que trzust the equitable estate, until the executors pay it over.
If that statement is correct, Keyser's Appeals would not be an
authority against spendthrift trusts being attached to an equitable
fee, for, in that case,' the trust was dry, and the cestui que trust
immediately became invested with the legal estate and the right
to demand it. By the same reasoning, however, Beck's Estatee
and Goe's Estateu, would seem to be authority for the proposition
' 269 Pa. - (Feb. 192).
6

Note 4, supra.

I Note 2,

supra.

7 Gray: Restraints on the Alienation of Property, 2d. ed., par. 124g.
(1895).
8'57 Pa. 236 (t886).
I Keyser's Appeal, supra.
10 133 Pa. 51. i9 A. 302 (t8go). Testatrix gave a share in her estate to

her step-daughter, and provided that it should not be liable for debts. Acreditor
obtained a judgment against the legatee and issued thereon an 4ttachment which
was served against the executor. ield: Payment must be made by the executor
to the legatee, notwithstanding the attachment execution.
"146 Pa. 431. 23 A.383 (1892). A share in an estate was givin with a
clause restraing alienation for debt. Held: The attaching creditor could not
reach the share of the legatee in the hands of the executor.

NOTES

that equitable fees may be subjected to spendthrift trusts; for,
under this view, the estates involved in those cases were equitable
fees.U
In Minnich's Estate13 the testatrix left to her son the net
income of a share in her estate without a devise over of the corpus
after his death. She left the corpus of the share to a trustee who
had active duties to perform, and it was expressly provided by
the testatrix that it should not be liable for any of the debts of the
son. The court held that a valid spendthrift trust was created
which could not be allowed to be defeated by handing over to the
son the corpus of his share in the estate., This case would seem
to be strongly in favor of the validity of spendthrift trusts when
attached to equitable fees,'4 but it is not a direct authority because
the court did not decide whether the son took an equitable life
estate or an equitable fee, or what would happen to the estate
after the death of the son.
Substantially the same view was reached in a subsequent
case decided by one of the lower courts," but this decision is not
of controlling authority. Minnich's Estate? was referred to in
Shower's Estate"s where the trustee took the legal estate and the
cestui que trust took the equitable estate, in which case the court
stated that the cestui que trust could not terminate the trust that
was created, and that the estate was exempt from involuntary
alienation. The court went much further in that case than was
necessary, however, because the will contained nothing at all
about involuntary alienation. The result reached in that case
seemed to be prompted by a desire on the part of the court to carry
opt the intention of the testatrix which was, according to the
court, that the cestui que trust should not be able to impair or
diminish the principal.
In the instant case, the court referred to Boie's EstateM and
Kelly v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company,2 as being most apposite
to the case under its consideration. In both of those cases it was
12Gray: Restraints on the Alienation of Property, 2d. ed., par. 124g
(1895): see. however, the explanation of Beck's Estate, supra, and Goes Estate,
supra, in Foulke's Rules Against Perpetuities, Restraints on Alienation, Restraints on Enjoyment, par. 222, and par. 223 (19o9).
"'206 Pa. 405,

55 Atd. 1067 (1903).

"4rhe son claimed that he was entitled to the legal estate on the ground
that there was no devise over.
16Foulke, note 12, supra, par. 248.
" Wright's Estate, 28 Pa. C. C. 540 (1903). The court sustained a clause
against involuntary alienation as against the attaching creditor of the cestui
.que trust.
17206 Pa. 405, 55 At. 1067 (1903).
" 211 Pa. 297, 60 At. 789 (19o5). The testator directed that hib property
-be divided equally among his chidren, the share going to a certain son to be
received by a trustee to invest the same, so that the son %ould enjoy the interest
thereof, 1ut in no way impair or dinini,h the principal. There was no gift over.
" 177 Pa. 190, 35 At: 724 (1896).
1220 Pa. 540. 75 Atl. 734 (1910).
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held that an absolute gift could not be reduced to a life estate
merely by the use of qualifying words which placed the corpus
of the estate in trust for the devisee during his life, the devisee to
receive the "usufructs and profits." On the contrary, it was held
in those cases that the devisee took an equitable fee without being.
stripped of the authority to dispose of it, by will or otherwise, to
take effect at his death. In neither of the above two cases were
there provisions against alienation, but the object of the testator,
states the court, was to protect the devisee from his own improvidence. If the law permits an absolute gift to be held in trust
during the life of the devisee, when the trust is activen for the
purpose of protecting the devisee from his own improvidence, there
should be no difficulty, under the same law, in accomplishing the
same object by expressly providing against alienation. In each
case the devisee would benefit as though he held a life estate,
except that he would have the right to dispose of the corpus by
will, or else it would go to his heirs. It is true that the trusts
were active in Boie's Estatem and in Kelly v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
It is equally true that there is some authority
for the proposition that the mere imposition of a spendthrift trust
to a gift will not make the trust active, but it is submitted that the:
cases cannot be satisfactorily distinguished upon that ground.
a There is no reason, moreover, why a court which permits
a spendthrift trust to be attached to an equitable life estate should
not permit it in connection with an equitable fee. Such a trust
could,.by such a court, be held valid without the importation of
any new principles and without a departure from the reasoning
of the earlier cases. The new principles were adopted when the
courts first permitted a spendthrift trust to be imposed on an
equitable life estate, because the courts then, in effect, created an
equitable estate with new incidents, and for which there was no'
corresponding legal estate. It has been recognized by two decisions
and one dictum that the principle of spendthrift trusts should not
he limited to equitable life interests. These cases arose in Massachusetts," Illinois,, and Iowa.2,
Before Gunnell's Estate,27 no case warranted the statement
that an equitable fee could in Pennsylvania be subjected to a
spendthrift trust. It is believed, however, that this case does
warrant such a statement. While inferences from the language
"Kreb's Estate, 184 Pa.

222,

39 At. 66 (z898).

See note 29, supra.

2 See note 26; supra.
u Haskell v. Ilaskell, 12S N. E. 6oi (Mass. 192o). The court held that
restraints on alienation are valid as respects equitable fees in real estate and in
po
lTr;p'inson v. Swam, 284 Ill.
ii, 119 N. E. 985 (1918), where the court
in its lecision stated that there was no reason for such a rule in the case of a
life estate which does not apply equally to a fee during the life of an owner.
2'Kiffner v. Kiffner, 185 Iowa 1o64, 171 N. W. Zgo (i9z9).
27See note 4, Supra.
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used by the court may be drawn to that effect, yet there is still a
stronger reason for such a belief. Mifinich's Estaten decided
that a valid spendthrift trust was created, but it did not decide
the quantum of the estate taken by the cestui que trust, that is,
whether it was a life or an absolute interest; Gunnell's Estate,
which arose on facts that were substantially the same as the facts
in Minnich's Estate, decided that the cestui que trust takes an absolute interest. The conclusion seems inevitable therefore, that
Gunnell's Estate and Minnich's Estate, considered together,
indicate that a restraint may be placed on the alienation of an
absolute equitable interest in Pennsylvania. .
H.F.B.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE FIXING VENUE FOR CRIMES
COMIMITTED NEAR COUNTY BOUNDARIE.-A popular statute among

legislatures in the United States for the purpose of obviating the
difficulty in proving the actual location of crimes committed at
or near the boundaries of counties, is an enactment which provides
that for offenses committed within 5oo yards of the boundary,
the offender may be tried in either county, regardless of -the actual
situs of the wrongful act. Such statutes have met with varying
treatment at the hands of the courts, depending somewhat upon
the wording of the state constitutions as -to trial by jury and somewhat upon the attitude of the court toward the trial by jury
provision.
The requirement that the jury must be from the vicinage,
("de tvcineto"), which is the provision that this statute generally
is said to infringe, is one of the earliest developments of the English
criminal law. The very word for jury in the Year Books is pais,
("country"). Originally the meaning attached to vicinagewas
visne or neighborhood.* Coke defines it as the "Town, Parish or
Hamlet, or Place known out of the Town, etc., within the Record,
within which the Mutter of Fact issuable is alleged, which is most
certain, and nearest thereto, the Inhabitants whereof may have the
n See note 13, supra.
2 A very thorough examination of the cases, bearing upon restraints on
the alienation of property, will be found in: Gray, Restraints on the Alienation
of Property (1895); and in Foulke's Rule Against Perpetuities, Restraints on
Alienation, Restraints on Enjoyment (9o9).
Both writers explain the origin.
of spendthrift trusts, and the arguments for ahd against them.
1Among the states in which this statute has been passed are Alabama,
Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan,
Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and WVIsconsin. It has been held unconstitutional in Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana,
Missouri, Tennessee and Vest Virginia: constitutional in Alabama, Iowa,
Minnesota, Pennsylvania (192o) and Wisconsin; and acted upon without
consideration of its constitutionality in Masachusetts, Michigan, New York
and Texas.
2Y. B. 7 Henry IV, 27; Y. B. 8 Henry VI, 34; Y. B. 17 Edward I1, 56;
Y. B. 47 Edward 111, 6.
•
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better z,nd more certain Knowledge of the Fact."3 The reason suggested by Coke for the vicinage requirement,-so that the jury
themselves may have knowledge of the case,-is that usually given,
although other writers have suggested that the purpose is to give
the accused the benefit of his good standing with his neighbors, if
he has gained such a position, and to allow him with more certainty
to secure his witnesses.'
When the character of the jury gradually changed from the
"country" familiar with the circumstances from personal knowledge, to a special body for the trial of facts, the necessity of drawing jurors from the immediate surroundings of the accused became
less pressing, and the vicinage requirement'became broadened to
include the entire county as the vicinage.$ "De vicineto: .
which is interpreted to be of the county where the fact is committed," says Blackstone in his Commentaries.6 And even that
requirement was weakened in England by several statutes to take
care of certain special cases.T
This then was the condition of the common law when the
various states adopted their constitutions. The wording of the
Bill of Rights in the state constitutions differed with respect to
this provision. Some states simply provided that the trial by jury
shall remain inviolate;9 some incorporated among the rights of
the accused, a provision that he was entitled to trial by an impartial
jury "of the vicinage"%; a few constitutions read "of the county""';
a large number "of the county or district"n; and some omitted
altogether to state from what district the jury should be drawn."
i Coke's Institutes 125, seec. 193.

4Swart v. Klimball, 43 Mich. 443 (188o) at p. 450; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (6th Ed.) page 391.
b 2 Hale's P. C. 264; 2 lawkins P. C., Chap. 40.
64 Blackstone's Commentaries 350.
7 Statute 33 llenry VIII c. 23. provided that persons suspected of treason
mizht be tried in an), county. Chitty inVol. Iof his Criminal Law, page 176,
collects similar English statutes. Cf. al.so 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 303.
e)laware (1897), Art. I, Sec. 4: Iowa (1857), Art. I, -ce 9; Michigan
(i.5o), Art. 6,Sec. 27; New Jers.y (1844), Art. I Sec. 7; New York (1894).
Art. 1, Scec. 2: Texas (1876), Art. I, Sec. 15; Washington (1889), Art. I, See. 21,
and many other states.
"Vicinage "--Kentucky (1i91), Bill of Rights, Sec. Ii; Pennsylvania
(1873), Art. I s-'. 9; Virginia (1870), Art. I, .'ec.to; Virginia (1902), Art. I,
Sec. M. The Con~titutions of Massachusetts (Art. I, Sec. 13) and Maine, (Art.
I .Sc. 6) read 'vicinity."
10 "Cumnty "--Arknsas

(174),

Art.

11

S•c.

to;

Florida (MS),

Declara-

tion of Rights. Sec. Iti; NMi.,is-~ippi (t8i8o), Art. Ill, Sec. 26; Tennessee (1870),

Art. 1, Sec. 9.
" "County or Iitrit"-Alabama (t9fit), Art. I, Sec. 6: Colorado
(.8761, Art. II, Se-. 16: Illinois (1870), Art. It,Sec. 9; Kansas (1859), Bill of
R~ht,..Sec. to; Mintes ,a. (t857), Art. I, Sec. 6; Ohio (1851). Art. 1, Sec. tO;
Wi-,'on.sin (1848). Art. 1. Sec. 7; Wct Virginia (1872), Art. II, Sec. 14. The
wordhing of tle I:ederal Cotstitution, Sixth Atnendtlent, is 'impartial jury of
the State anl district
....... Nhi-h di.-,trict
shall have'been previously ascertainrdl by law". t'. S. .Maxon, Fel. C.as. No. 15,748, .5Blatchford 360 (t866).
": 'alifornia (88o): Mithitzan (185o); New Jtrsey (1844); New York (1894):
TeMas (t b76). In Michigan. Ne," Y'ork and Texa:- thi6 Ilsundary statute has been
enforced wit hotit co'n.ider.at ion of it., cun.stit tionaditv. People v. Davis, 56 N. Y.
95 1 ;"74): lla.ckney v, State. 74 S. WV. 554 (tvx. ('r. Ai'p. 19)3); Madrid v. State,
71 Tcx.r Rep. 42o. t6t S. \V.93 (19l3); Bayliss v. People, 46 .Mich. 22 (t88).
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Where the constitution provides that the.jury must be from
the county, it seems clear that such a statute as that relating
to venue of trials for offenses near the county boundaries is in
violation of the Constitution. And this is the result which the
cases have reached.u In those states where the constitutional
provision is "county or district,- there is a conflict of opinion as
to the validity of such a venue statute. Some courts hold the
statute void, on the theory that "district" can not be considered
us including part of another county.1 4 In one case in Tennesseet,
it was argued that "district" meant a Circuit including several
counties, but the court refused to concede the soundness of the
argument, saying that the "district" provision only had reference
to the state of things under a former constitution, at a time when
there was only one court for several counties, constituting-what was
'then called a "district." But on the other hand, in some of those
states which have the "county or district"provision, the boundary
statute as to venue has been upheld." "This very peculiar
language," said one judge concerning this provision,' "is obviously
designed to avoid the difficulties which had arisen at the common
law, without depriving the accused of trial by a jury of the vicinage." The additional provision sometimes contained in these
state constitutions,-"which county or district shall have been
previously ascertained by law,"-is relied on by some courts to
establish the validity of this boundary statute."8
In the cases just considered the decision turned on the meaning of a particular phrase in the constitution. A more fundamental question is raised where the state constitution provides
for a trial by a jury of the "vicinage," or impliedly or expressly
preserves the trial by jury as heretofore. This is the situation
in Pennsylvania, where the state constitution contains both of
these provisions.", In that state the Supieme Court has just
been called upon to decide the constitutionality of this boundary.
statute for fixing venue, passed sixty years ago. The court up"1 Dougan v. State, 30 Ark. 4t (1875); State v. Lowe, 21 %V. Va. 782
(1883); State v. Montgomery, x115 La. 155, 38 So. 949 (19o5). Is"Louisiana
the constitutional provision is "parish" instead of "county," (Art. IX, Constitution of 1898). Compare State v. Harris, 107 La. 325, 31 So. 782 (1902).
in which case it was held that the defendant had waived his right to object to
the venue.
"Armstrong v. State, i Coldwell 338 (Tenn. 186o); Buckrice v. People,
110 III. 29 (1884).
1"Armstrong v. State, supra.
11Grogan v. State. 44 Ala. 9 (1870); Jackson v. State, go Ala.-59o, 8 So.
862 (1890); State ex rel.
Brown v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587 (1884); State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 4.7 (1869).
'In Re F.hlred, 46 Wis.530, 548 (t879).
,,State v. Robinson, supra.

" "Trial
.
by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain
inviolate," (Art. I, Sec. 6). "in all criminal prosecutions the accused bath a
right to

. .

(Art. I, Sec. 9).

.

. a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage,"
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held the statute,20 relying on the fact that the primary meaning
of vicinage was not county but rather neighborhood or vicinity.
The Pennsylvania court relies strongly on Massachusetts decisionsu
applying in that state a similar statute, since the Massachusetts
constitution provides=: "In criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts in the vicinity where they happen, is one of the greatest securities for the life, liberty and property of the citizen."
But the Pennsylvania court does not point out the fact that the
Massachusetts, court- has never specifically passed on the constitutionality of this boundary statute, either in the first case or in
subsequent cases under the statute.' 4 Nor is attention called to
another Massachusetts case,2' construing this very section of their
constitution, in which Chief Justice Parker comments on the
difference between vicinity and vicinage:-" For the word vicinity
is not technical, with a precise legal meaning, as the word county
or the ancient word visne, vicinage, would be held to be."
The question seems not to have arisen in Kentucky and Virginia, the only other states except Pennsylvania in which the technical word vicinage is used, although the Virginia court has intimated:&that it will give to that provision a liberal interpretation.
The West Virginia Supreme Court in a dictum2" presumed "that
it would be held in Virginia, that the word vicinage in their constitution was not equivalent to county," but held the boundary
statute bad in their own state because the constitution said
"county." But in Missouri, where the vicinage provision had
been in a former constitution and where the court construed the
present constitution to have the same effect, it was held that a
statute like that in Pennsylvania was void.27 The reasoning behind the Missouri decision is that by common law at the time of
the adoption of the state constitution vicinage meant county, and
when the word was incorporated into the constitution, it was that
definite right which it was intended should be preserved.
The logic of this case is strong, and on strict principles of
construction the conclusion of the Missouri court seems correct.
28Commonwealth v. Collins, 268 Pa. 295; rio Atl. 738 (1920). The
satatute in this case is Sec. 48 of the Criminal Code, (Act March 31, 186o, P. ..
In the case the offense was proved actually to have been committed in
the county other than that in which the offender was convicted, but the conviction was affirmed on the strength of the statute, which the court held constitutional
v. Costley, 118 Mass. 25 (1875); Comm. v. Matthews, 167 Mass.
173 (1"Comm.
fig.
427).

'Constitution of .Massachusetts, (178o), Art. I. Sec. 13.
Comm. v. (;illon, 2 Allen (84 Mass.) 5o2 (1861).
"'Comm. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 550 (.Maqs. 1824), at page 553.
*' Ruffin's CaSC 21 Gratt. 79o (Va. 1871).
^6State v. Lowe, supra, note 13.
'? Petition of McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370 (1885). An Iowa case under.

similar conditions holds the statute constitutional. State v. Pugsley, 75 Iowa
742, 38 N. W. 631 (1888). But in Iowa the statute was passed before the first
State constitution.

NOTES

Yet the decision in the recent Pennsylvania case in going back to
the original purpose of the vicinage requirement, rather than applying the hard and fast rule of Blackstone's period, seems in accord
with the policy of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to construe
liberally the trial by jury provision of its Constitution.2i The
cause of public justice is advanced, and the accused suffers no
actual detriment in the trial of his case.

R.D.

CREDIT

EXTENSION

AS

AN

"UNFAIR

PRACTICE"

UNDER

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.-The growing power of administra-

tive tribunals over the services and practices of public service
corporations in their relations with the public and with each other,
is well illustrated by the decisions growing out of the recent litigation between the Postal Telegraph-Cable Company and the
Western Union Telegraph Company. The New York Court of
Appeals has affirmed an order of the Public Service Commission
requiring the Western Union Company to extend in intrastate
business the same credit facilities to the Postal Company as it
extends to other competing or 'non-competing customers., As
affecting interstate transactions, a similar ruling has been made by
the Interstate Commerce Commission., The decisions, based on
statutes which did not specifically cover the question in issue,
result in a striking down of the common law principle that credit
extension by a common carrier or other public servant is a matter
of grace, and as such does not form the basis for a charge of aiscrimination.3
In view of the statutory provisions involved,.a statement
of the practice complained of by the Postal Company is important. For more than thirty years prior to August I, I919, the
Western Union had extended credit to the complainant company
both on company messages and messages tendered for transmission
for customers of the latter. In cases where the sender was a
charge customer of both companies, the tolls would be charged
directly against the sender; company messages and messages
from customers of the Postal Company not on the charge list of
the defendant company would be charged against the complainant, and monthly settlements would follow. When the Postal
Company reduced its rates, the Western Union refused to extend
credit except for company messages, though it continued to extend broader credit facilities to companies other than the Postal
Company.
n Comm. v. Balph, iii Pa. 365, 3 At. 220 (1885); Dallas v. Kemble,
215 Pa. 41o; 64 At. Si (xgo6).

, People ex rel. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Com129 N. E. 220 (N. V. 1920).
mission,
. 2 Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 59 I. C.
C. 512 (1920).

22Wyman Public Service Corporations, Sec. 435.
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The New York statute' has sweeping provisions as to the
service required of public servants, and the court was able to find

that the practice of the Western Union Company violated themandate as to "impartiality."
Under somewhat similar statutes,
other state courts have reached a like conclusion,$ while under
statutes prohibiting the granting of "unjust advantages or privileges," a contrary result has been reached,' the cases going far to.
uphold the right of the public servant to grant its credit as it sees
fit.
It is the decision of the Interstate Comnierce Commission,
however, which raises an interesting problem under the Interstate
Commerce Act. 7 Two sections of the Act are of possible application in support of the ruling. Section 3 prohibits the subjection
of "any person, firm or corporation to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." Section
15 provides that "whenever the Commission shall be of the opinionthat any practice is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly
discriminatory," the Commission may prescribe what practice
is to be thereafter followed.
A decided majority of the lower Federal courts have held
that partiality as to credit extensions either to carrier or shipper
is not prohibited by Section 3 of the Act,8 irrespective of the motive
underlying the action.9 An early Federal decision held otherwise t*
and one court in construing the prohibition as to "discriminations"
in the Elkins Act"' ruled that impartial treatment in the way of
credit was required thereby. 12 The theory of the majority cases
is to the effect that subject to the two leading prohibitions that
charges shall not be unreasonable and that there shall not be unjust discrimination, the commerce act left common carriers as
they were at common law, 13and that as the right to grant or withhold credit has not been specifically denied by the Act, it stilr
exists. Such a construction gives to the statute in this respect 2
partial anesthetic, for in the field of discrimination the commor'Laws of N. Y. 1909. C. 219, see. 103.
'Adams Express Company v. Indiana, 161 Ind. 328, 67 N.E. 1033 (1903);Wadley Southern Railway Company v. Georgia, 137 Ga. 497, 73 S. E. 741 (1912).
' Atchinson etc. R. Co. v. Bowman, 158 Pac. 814 (Col. 1916); Brown Coal
Co., v. Grand Trunk Railway 1 a9 Mich. 565, 124 N. W. 528 (gio); Russellv.
Miller, 98 Miss. 185, 53 South 49.5 (i910), semble; Allen v. Cape Fear R. Co.,.
ioo N. C. 397, 6 S. E. 105 (1888).
24 Stat. L. 379, as amended.
' Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 22 Fed. 32 (1884);.
Oregon Ry. Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 6z Fed. 158 (1894); Little Rock
etc. R. Co. v. St. Louis Ry. Co., 63 Fed. 775 (:894); Gulf etc. R. Co. v. Miami
S. S. Co., 86 Fed. 407 (1898).
S(;amhle.Robinson Co. v. Chicago etc. R. Co., z68 Fed. 161 (1909).
11 Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 22 Fed. 404 (1884).
".32 Stat. 1.- 847, as amended 34 Stat. L. 587, Sec. 2.

* locking Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 21o Fed. 735 (1914), affirming.

194 Fed. 234 (191).

" Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Chicago etc. R. Co., supra.

NOTES

law, at the time of the passage of the Act, had had a comparatively
short time in which to work out any well recognized principle
as to what constituted a "discrimination."14 The Supreme Court
has yet to pass upon Section 3 in this connection. In the case of
Wadley Southern Railway Company v. Georgia,", a state statute
was upheld prohibiting partiality in credit extension by a railroad.,; In the course of its opinion the court merely commented
on the contrary opinions in the lower courts. In view of the
authorities, therefore, the ruling of the Commission, if based solely
upon Section 3, is questionable.
It is under Section 15 as noted above, however, that the ruling
should find support. This provision giving to the Commission
control over "unfair practices" first appeared in the 19o6 amendment 7 to the Interstate Commerce Act. It was continued in
the subsequent amendment of i9xo,8 which brought interstate
telephone and telegraph companies under the prohibitions of the
Act. Few decisions have been rendered interpreting the scope of
the words "unfair practices,""9 although the Commission in a
previous case considered the problem of credit extension and at
that time forecast its present ruling.20 Giving the term a meaning
not merely co-extensive with practices amounting to a discrimination at the common law, but rather one in keeping with the
press of present day problems, the Commission has found the
action of the Western Union to be unfair and prejudicial to the
business of the Postal Company. It is to be noted that the offending company is not required by the ruling to continue to grant
credit to whomsoever applies for it. Nor is it required to transmit
messages received from the complainant company at the latter's
lower schedule of rates. The only requirement placed upon the
Western Union is that if it does maintain a credit policy, it shall
treat Trojan and Tyrian alike, with the proviso that it may exact
security from those of questionable financial standing.
The ruling of the Commission is in keeping with the recognized trend of Congressional control and legislation in matters
connected with interstate commerce. The entire mass of legislation on the subject from its inception in 1887 to the present time.
shows that the purpose of Congress was "to cut up by the roots
every form of favoritism, discrimination or inequality".
The
"See 66 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 123, and 67 Univ. of Pa. Law Review

1o9 as to origin and scope of the rule-as to di~criminaton by public servants at
common law.
"235 U. S. 651 (1915).

Wadle,
'
Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 337 Ga. 497, 73 S. E. 741 (1912).

3734 Stat. L. 584.

".36 Stat. . 530.
"' The plenary powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission under this
.ection were recognized in the case of I. C. C. v. I. C. R. R. Company 215 U. S.
452 (191o) ant Balto. and Ohio It. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co.. 215 U. S. 481 (1910).
"American Coal Co. v. Alichigan Central R. Co., 36 1. C. C. 195 (1915).
2t Louibville etc. R. Co. v. Mottley 219 U. S. 467, 478 (1911).
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interpretation given to the words "unfair practices" is in line with
the policy of Congress as reflected in the establishing of a Federal
Trade Commission with plenary powers over unfair competition,
and that shown by the Transportation Act of 1920W2 which in amending Section 3 of the Act of 1887 provides in specific terms that the
Commerce Commission may prescribe rules as to the extension
of credit by interstate carriers when an interchange of traffic takes

place.2
J.R. Jr.
SCOPE OF PENNSYLVANIA WORKEMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
OF 19i5.-A very important case determining the exclusiveness of

the remedy under the Pennsylvania Vorkmen's Compensation
Act of 1915' was decided recently by a Common Pleas Court,?
wherein it was held that the act provided a complete system con.trolling recovery in case of industrial accident and that therefore
anyone who might have maintained an action at law for such
injuries or death is now bound by the remedies given by the Act.
It is well settled that in all cases where no agreement'has
been filed, whereby the parties refuse to accept the-provisions of
the Act,3 the employee's rights4 and those of his dependent relatives5 are confined to those given by the Act as they are clearly
covered by its provisions. The only doubt arises in cases oi parties
who prior to the passage of this Act had a right of actiorr for death
of a relative resulting from negligence on the part of the employer
and who are given no rights whatever under the Act. Thus, in
the recent case referred to, the mother of a deceased minor sued
in trespass to recover damages on account of the minor's death
resulting from the negligence of the defendant Company in supplying the decedent with improper tools and insufficient instruction..
The mother alleged non-dependency contending that the Act
applied only to employees and their dependent relatives and that
therefore she was not bound by its provisions and could sue in

" Act. Feb. 28, 1920, Stat. 66th Cong., c. 91, Section 405 provides in part
as follows: "No carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of this Act, shall
deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight transported by it
until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules
and regulations as the Commission

may

etc. 27 Dist. Rep. 535 (Pa. z918),

But where a minor is illegally employedand

from time to time prescribe to assure

prompt payment of all such rates and to prevent unjust discrimination."
13See Ex Parte No. 73, 59 1. C. C. 456 (1920) for the application of this
provision to a concrete case.
Penna. P. L. 736.
I Act of June 2, i95.
O'Hara v. Standard Steel Works Co. No. 95, C. P. Mifflin County, Aug.
Term 1920. Decided Feb. 18, 1921. (Unreported).
I Act of June 2, 1915 supra I 302.
'Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co. 255 Pa. 3 (t:96). Kaplan v. Honey

is injured while so working, he may bring an action of trespass.
National

Tube

Co.

112

Atl.

73

(Pa.

1920).

'Liberato v. Royer & Herr. 28 Dist. Rep. 268 (Pa. 1919).

Lincoln v.

NOTES
trespass.

On statutory demurrer judgment was given for defend-

ant.

Although the Legislature may have intended the Act to cover
all cases arising out of industrial accidents, the particular case in
question is not specifically covered. Thus it is provided that the
Act "shall bind the employer and his personal representatives, and
the employee, his or her wife and husband . . . . next of
kin and other dependents."' The use of the words "other dependents" seems to indicate that the parties previously enumerated
are to be qualified by the word "dependent," so that "next of
kin" should be interpreted to read "dependent next of kin."
Furthermore the word "dependent" has been repeatedly construed
to mean actual dependency. 7 Thus it is clear that parties who are
not dependent, do not come within the letter of the Act and therefore would seem not to be bound by its provisions.
The court in the case under discussion based its decision on
the theory that the rights of parties seeking a recovery can rise
no higher than those of the employee himself and that therefore
all are bound by the Act.' Although it is true that the employee
is so bound it does not follow that all others are equally bound.
The right of an injured employee to sue for damages is one given
by the Common Law and although his right to one particular
method of recovery has been taken away, another and more valuable
one has been substituted in its place. Therefore the original cause
of action, extended by taking away several of the employer's
defenses remains; the liabilities alone are changed. Although it
must be conceded that had the cause of action been extinguished
by the Act then it would follow that the rights of those claiming
under this same cause of action could rise no higher than that of
the employee. However that is not this case, and although two
different parties may have the rights growing out of the same cause
of action it does not follow that if the remedy of the one is changed
by statute the other is also, unless specifically so stated.
It is clear that the Statute is remedial and is intended to
compensate dependents. There was no effort to make any provision for those who were not dependent,' Thus the employer
Act of June 2, 1915 supra,§ 303.
7IBenish v. Union Coal & Coke Co. 27 Dist. Rep. 176 (Pa. x918). Karpati
v. Cambria Steel Co. 70 Pa. Sup. Ct. 202 (1919).. Morris v. Yough Coal &
Supply Co. 266 Pa. 216 (192o). But a father though not dependent upon his
son for his own support but for the support of the family, is entitled to compensaHall v. Pittsburgh Coal Co. 26 Dist. Rep.

tion.

422 (Pa. 1917).

'O'llara v. Standard Steel Works Co. supra.
Thus it is provided that " . . . should any dependent of a deceased
employee die, or should the widow or widower remarry, or should the widower
become capable of self-support, the right of such dependent or such widower,
to compensation under this section, shall cease." Act of June 2, 1915 supra
§ 307 subsection 9.
It has also been held that after the death of a dependent, no right to
compensation accrues to or vests in dependent's estate or administrator. South
Side Trust Co., Admr. v. Winter Garden Co. 27 Dist. Rep. 122 (1918).
-
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was deprived of his Common Law defenses"0 but in return for this
the employee and his dependents were deprived of their prior
actions and there was substituted a fixed scale of compensation
enabling the employer to avoid troublesome lawsuits and excessive
verdicts and insure himself against all losses. Since prior1 to the
Act a right of recovery was given regardless ot dependency" and as
no right is substituted for that originally held by non-dependents
it seems difficult to hold that so valuable a right should be taken
away by implication. If it was the intention of the Legislature
to cover all accidents arising out of industry it should have been
expressly so stated.
Other jurisdictions wherd similar legislation is in effect have
held that where rights given prior to such acts have not been taken
away specifically or by necessary implication, the former remedies
remain. Thus it has been held in New York that the brother and
sisters of a decedent (there being no other living relatives) might
maintain an action at law since no right was substituted for that
which they originally enjoyed, and to hold otherwise would excuse
the defendant from any liability for his negligence.12 And so a
mother was allowed to recover for the loss of her minor son's services
although the son himself had received compensation under the
Act for his injury, on the theory that her Common Law right to
recover for medical expenses and loss of services could not be taken
away by implication." In Kansas it was held that although there
was no limitation provided as to the time within which an action
could be brought under their Workmen's Compensation Act, the
limitation provided in the earlier statute giving parties a right of
action under such circumstances would apply under the new Act,
since only so much of the former acts was repealed as is repugnant
to the latest Act.34

10Act of June
1

Penna.

2, x91s supra § 201.
Act of April 15, 18.51Penna. 1?.L. 674 amended by Act of April 26, 1855

L. 3o9.

P.

12Shanahan v. Monarch Engineering Co. i59 N. Y. S. 257. 172 App.
221 (1916), following Shinnick v. Clover Farms Co. 154 N. Y. S. 423.
369 App. Div. 236 (191 5) which decided that an employee whose ear had been

Div.

bitten off by a (log could maintain an action at law since the Compensation Act

covered only injuries resulting in disaLility.
The New York Supreme Court in Connors v. Seniet-Solvay Co. i59 N.Y.
S. 43. 94 Misc. Rep. 405 (3936) refused to allow an emiployee who had received
compensation for an injury to maintain a further action at law to recover addi.
tional compxens-ttion for pain, suffering and disfigurement, stating that Shinnick
v. Clover Farms Co., supra had been overruled by Jensen v. Southern Pacific
Co. 1o9 N. E.6oo. 215 N. Y. 514 ('9,5), which was decided on the theory that
the remedy provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive and
in full substitution for any actidn of damages. lowever as the exact point
decided by the Shinrick case was not before the Court in the Jensen Case and as
the Jensen Case was differentiated in the recent decision of Morris v. Moildoon,.
18o N. Y. S. 32i. 19o App. Div. 689 (1920) it is probably still law in New York.
3King v. Viscloid Co. io6 N. E. 988. 219 Mass. 420 (1914). Contra
Buonfiglio v. Neumann & Co. 107 Atl. 285 (N. J. i19).
"4lar.wood v. Railway Company. 171 Pac. 354. 101 Kas.-215 (1917).
1

NOTES

However, a contrary but exceedingly interesting view as to
the effect of such legislation is presented in a Wisconsin Case which
held that their Workmen's Compensation Act applied to an injury
occurring outside of the State where the contract of employment
was entered into and suit brought in Wisconsin. 1 The court
proceeded on the theory that all the rights and liabilities that had
existed in such cases prior to this Act were entirely extinguished
by this new legislation, the fundamental basis for which is the
economic conception that "injuries to employees are regarded *as
necessarily incidental to the conduct of industry under modern
conditions, and not the result of a wrong committed by the employer
and that therefore the damages arising therefrom should be borne
by the whole industry, rather than by the employer." Accordingly the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act is as
much a part of every contract of employment entered into in
Wisconsin as their law of negotiable instruments is a part of every
promissory note made, executed and delivered in Wisconsin.
Although there is no doubt but that the economic conception
underlying this legislation is that stated by the Wisconsin court,
still it is going very far to read into the Act by implication an
intent on the part of the legislature to completely abolish the rights
which previously existed and substitute for them those provided
by the Act, so that in many cases parties guilty of negligence
which results in death to an employee will be completely excused
from liability.
There is one grave objection however in allowing an action
outside the Workmen's Compensation Act, for in every case where
an action could have been maintained at law the relatives could
allege non-dependency and so there would be restored a great
field of litigation which the Act was designed to prevent. To
remedy this defect the Legislature should provide for either
damages (not compensation) regulated by the amount of wages
received by the deceased employee in cases of non-dependency
where an action could have been maintained prior to the Act, or
it should expressly declare that all recoveries for actions arising
out of industrial accident are to be determined under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915..
J. S.
COMPULSORY ABOLISIItENT OV GRADE CROSSINGS AND THE

DUE PROCESS CLAUsE.-In the recent case of Erie Railroad Company v. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners el alP the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New
Is Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co. 170 X. W. 275. 169 Wis. 1o6(x919).
Contra Gould's Case 102 N. E-.693. 215 Mass. 480 (1913). Lemieux v. Boston
&.Me.R. R. io6 N. E. 992.219 Mass. 399 (914). See'note, L. R. A. i9i6A, 443.
* Only decisions of the United States Supreme Court are cited.
141 Sup. Ct. 169 (1920).
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Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, holding that the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners had authority to direct the Erie
Company to abolish fourteen grade crossings in the city of Paterson. It was the contention of the counsel for the Erie Company
that in as much as the work would cost over $2,000,o0 whereas
there was only Sxoo,ooo available it was unreasonable to require.
such an expenditure of money and that such an order was therefore'a deprivation of property without due process of law, contrary
to the 'provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority
of the court, however, were of the opinion thai it was.a valid exercise of the police power, and went to the extent of saying that,
in as much as it was a matter involving the public safety and welfare, the legislature could in its discretion require the abolition
of all grade crossings, even though to do so might result in the
bankruptcy of the company. In their view the question simply
resolved itself into an adjustment of two conflicting rights, that of
the public using the streets and that of the railroads and the public
using them and "gen~erically the streets represent the more important interest of the two." The railroads have a pefect right
to operate, subject always, however, to the limitation that the mode
of operation might be restricted or altered as public safety demands.
It is no argument to say that a railroad is financially unable to
make such alterations as the state may deem essential to public
safety and welfare. If it cannot fulfill its obligation to §ocety
it is better that it should cease to exist rather than that the public
should bear this additional burden.
Every person holds his property subject to such police regulations as the legislature in its wisdom may enact for the general
welfare, and private interests must be made subservient to the
general interest of the community. Should a person so use his
property as to impair the public safety, morals, or welfare the
legislature has the right to correct the evil, even to the extent of
depriving him of his property?3 And it is not incumbent upon the
state to compensate the person for the property taken, the theory'
being that he has shared in the general betterment of the community: It is manifest that the power of a state under its police
power is very broad. However, it is by no means unlimited.
Thus under the guise of enforcing police regulations there must
not be an arbitrary or unwarranted interference with private
rights or property.5 And further the exercises of the power must
be reasonable i. e., it must bear some real and substantial relation
to the end sought to be effected. 6 Whether or not a given police
I Slaughter House Cases 16 Wall. 36 (1872).
. Infra Mugler v. Kansas.
4(Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S.
77 semble (1897).
6 Yick \Vo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
Infra Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. 154 U. S. 362 (1893).
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regulation is arbitrary or unreasonable is7 a matter of judicial irnquiry and not legislative interpretation.
In view of the appellant's contention that this was an unreasonable exercise of the power it may be interesting to see to
what extent the courts have gone in upholding this broad discretion. In the case of Mugler -. Kansasg the court upheld the
constitutionality of a statute making it illegal to sell intoxicating
beverages except for medicinal purposes. The plaintiff owned a
brewery before the enactment of the statute. He maintained
that the passage of this law rendered his property practically
valueless and the law was therefore unconstitutional in that it
deprived him of his property without due prccess of law. The
court conceded that the plaintiff was being deprived qf his property,
but they also recognized that the purpose of the law was to
abolish the liquor traffic, which the legislature of Kansas had
determined was detrimental to the public welfare and morals. The
question for the court to decide was not whether or not it was for
the welfare of the people that the liquor traffic should be abolished,
but, granting that it was for the welfare of the people, and further
granting that a state by virtue of its police power can pass such
laws as have a reasonable relation to the public welfare, was this
law which resulted practically in the absolute confiscation of the
plaintiff's property a reasonable exercise of that power. The court
decided that it was, thereby uphoiding the constitutionality of
the law.
There are many decisions to the effect that a railroad can
be required to build a viaduct over or under its tracks at a given
point where it can reasonably be said that public safety requires.'
In the principal case the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
required the Erie Company to change the grade at fourteen different points in the city of Paterson. If a railroad can be made to
change the grade at one point it is difficult to see why it cannot
be made to change the grade at fourteen. The general considerations are the same. If it is reasonable to require the Company
to expend money to change the grade at one dangerous crossing
it would seem reasonable to require them to change the grade at
fourteen crossings which the Commission has decided are reason7 Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223 (1904).
1123 U. S. 623 (1887); See also Foster v. Kansas 112 U. S. 201 (1884);
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877). On the other hand for an unreasonable interference with private rights see: Reagan v. Farmers Loan and
Trust Company, 154 U. S. 362 (i89.); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 566 (1897);
Peik v. Chicago & North Western Railroad Company, 94 U. S. 164 (1876).
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Omaha, 235 U. S. 121 (1914);

New York and New England Railroad Company v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (1894);
Cincinnati, Indianapolis and Western Railroad Co. v. Connersville, 218 U. S.
336 (191o). Also see Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S.
241 (1918), where the court held the city of Denver had authority to require
the railroad to change the location of its tracks where it was deemed necessary
for public safety.
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ably dangerous to public safety, and for that matter at all such
crossings as may be considerec reasonably dangerous to the public.
It would seem that the court is correct in saying that the fact that
the power may be exercised so as to bankrupt the Company is
no reason for denying its existence.
TV. H. N.
EQUITABLE

RELIEF AGAINST

JUDGMENTS

FRAUDULENTLY

AT LAw.-The problem of-equitable interference with
judgments tainted with fraud, like the broader proposition of
collateral attack upon judgments, is one which has admitted of
varying treatment by the courts. Presenting as it does the attempt to do justice to the petitioner and at the same time to hold
fast to the maxim interest rei publicae tit sit finis litium, there is
ample reason why the problem should have been treated with
divergent effect. An examination of the cases brings out the fact
that the general trend of decisions has been to steer a course between Scylla and Charybdis and to reach principles which in their
broader application will do substantial justice. The statement,
therefore, that fraud vitiates every contract, decree or judgment
to the extent of the fraud must be taken curn grano in view of the
decisions of the equity court in this connection.
The fraud which will form the basis for equitable interference with a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction has been
described as "fraud relating to the procuring of the judgment
itself,"1 or as described by well considered cases "fraud which is
'extrinsic or collateral' t& the issue" submitted to the court pronouncing the judgment. 2 These terms take on meaning only
when referred to adjudicated cases. For example, equity will
interfere with the enforcement of a judgment where the court
itself has been imposed on by the prevailing party3 or where an
attorney corruptly sells out his client's interest,' or where a party
has been lulled into a sense of security or inaction by the false
promise of compromise or settlement,5 or where by the fraud of
the prevailing party the defendant has been prevented from presenting a legal defense.6 In such cases there has been no subOBTAINED

'Wbitcomb v. Shultz 223 Fed. 268 (1915).
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878); McEvoy v. Quaker
City Cab Co. 267 Pa. 520 (1920).
Wickersham v. Comerford, 96 Cal., 433, 31 Pac. 358 (1892); Larson v.
Williams, too Iowa, 11o, 69 N. W. 441 (1896); Wonderly v. Lafayette County,
15o Mo. 635, 51 S. W. 74.5
(1899).
.Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., Iit U. S. 420 (1883); Sanford v.
White, 132 Fed. 531 (1904); Renner V. Kannally, 193 I1. 121, 61 N. E. 1026
(1901).

6'.Greenwaldt v. May, 127 Ind. 51t, 27 N. E. x58 (189o); Cadwallader
v. McClay, 37-Neb. 359, 55 N. W. 1054 (1893); Fidelity Co. v. Crenshaw, 120
Tenn. 6o6, 110 S. NV. 1017 (igo8).
6Brooks v. Twitchell, 182 Mass. 443, 65 N. E. 843 (1902): Webster v.
Skipwith, 26 Miss. 341 (1853).
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mission of the issues to a conclusive trial, as the collateral facts
constituting the fraud were not before the court and hence were
not passed upon. Provided there has been no fault or laches on
the petitioner's part 7 and provided that the truth of the allegations appears very strongg and provided further that the fraud
had a material effect on the judgnent,9 equity will grant relief in
these cases.
On the other hand, the equity court has refused to be moved
against an existing judgment by mere allegations of fraud as to
the subject matter which formed the issue upon which the judgment in question was pronounced. The party seeking relief will
be considered to have had his day in court, at which time he
For this
should have unearthed the fraud of his adversary.
reason, judgment in such a case is held to be conclusive, no matter
how strong a case for equitable relief the petitioner may present.
Perjury is, perhaps, most representative of this "intrinsic fraud."
According to the more generally accepted view, the allegation of
no
perjury of the prevailing party and of his witnesses affords
basis for enjoining the enforcement of the judgment. 1 0 The
truth or falsity of the evidence presented by both parties was a
fact in issue, and for that reason the judgment is held to be conclusive upon the parties. The falsity of the evidence has not prevented a party to a suit from exhibiting his own case, or from disproving the case of his opponent.
In connection with the distinction drawn above, the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, recently pronounced in the case of Chicago, R. I. etc. Ry. Co. v. Callicotte t '
and that of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of
McEvoy v. Quaker City Cab Co.12 are apposite in giving lengthy
reviews of the authorities. The facts which formed the basis of the
opinion of the federal court are significantly illustrative of the
principles involved, although the court's application of the principles is perhaps questionable. Callicotte was injured December
28, 1914, while an employee of the railway company and while
in its service. In April, 1915 he instituted an actior in the state
court for personal injuries, and in June, 1915, verdict was rendered
andjudgment entered in hisfavor to the amount of Si8,ooo. Motion
for new trial was heard and dismissed and the judgment was
ICarney v. Marseilles, 136 Ill. 401 (1891); Jewett v. Dringer, 5i N. J.
Eq. 586 (1879).
I Bloss v. Hull, 27 NW.Va. 5o3 (z886).
9 Holton v. Davis, io8 Fed. 138 (1go1); Boyden v. Reed, 55 Ill. 458
(1870); Dringer v. Eric Ry. Co. 42 N. J. Eq. 573,8 At. 8i i (t887).
10United States v. Throckmorton, supra; Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129,
25 Ain. St. Rep. 159 (t891); Graves v. Graves, 132 Iowa x99, to9 N. W. 707
(19o6), io .. R. A. (N. S.) 216; McEvoy v. Quaker CityCabCo.,supra. See,
however, Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891).
" 267 Fed. 799 (1920).
12267 Pa. 527, 110 Atl. 366 (142o).
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affirmed in state supreme court.1 The railway filed a bill in
the federal court in December, 1916, alleging inler alia that the
respondent had feigned total paralysis of his legs as a result of the
injury, had testified and secured others to testify falsely as to the
extent of his injuries, and that when examined by his own and
the petitioner's medical experts had caused to be produced a temporary paralysis which could not be detected by ordinary medical
tests. The petition alleged further, and the answer admitted,
that the respondent had free use of his legs since, at the latest,
August, 1915, but had feigned paralysis and disguised himself
until January, 1916, when the petitioner discovered his true condition. The answer denied all fraud, though it admitted that
free use of the legs was recovered two months after the verdict.
The court granted an injunction enjoining execution on the judgment, and setting it aside.
The decision is based upon the determination that the concocting of the history of the case by means of perjured witnesses
and the deception of the medical men by feigning paralysis was an
"extrinsic and collateral" fraud. It is difficult to see how this
can be so in view of the court's own citations. It is certainly true
that the nature and extent of the respondent's injurywasthevery
thing in issue in the trial at law; indeed, it was the only fact in
issue, since Callicotte was entitled to recover, irrespective of the
negligence of the railway or of his own contributory ilegligence.14
The opinion cites no analogous cases, and relies largely on a dictum
of a case which on its facts would militate against the present
decision.14
The admitted recovery of the respondent within two months
after the verdict for $8,ooo was rendered was probably the impelling motive for granting relief. The equity of the case is doubtful on the court's own principles. Human legal institutions can
but approximate justice, and it would be, perhaps, for the best
if the court in the instant case had hewed to the line of previous
decisions. If equity acknowledged no principles, but was moved
only as each case appealed to its sense of justice the decision has
its equity. But when principles have been adopted, it is of questionable value to put them aside in a pressing case, especially when
the entire nature of the relief is such as should be meted out with
the highest degree of caution.
J. R. Jr.
" See decision in State Court, 204 S. W. 529 (Mo. 1920).
1The suit had been instituted under Safety Appliance Act Mar. 2, 1893,
C. 196, 27 Stat. L. 531. Cf. New York Central R. Co. v. Harrold, 65 How.
Prac. 89 (1883); Essex County v. Berry, 2 Vt. 161 (1829) in which relief against
alleged excessive damages was denied.
'$ Obiter in Wabash R. Co. v. Mirrielces, 182 Mo. 126. 81 S. W. 437 (1904).
See however Traction Co. v. Dent, i59 Mo. App. 220, 140 S. W. 6o6 (1911).

